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Converging First Amendment Principles for 
Converging Communications Media 
Thomas G. Krattenmakert and L.A. Powe, Jr.tt 
For students of telecommunications law and technology. it has become a 
trivial ritual to observe that telecommunications technologies and media are 
converging. Neither producers nor purchasers of audio or video information 
should find much use, in the near future, for such terms as "television," 
"computer," "telephone," or "radio." These objects are no longer distinct 
devices and we believe that any differences among them are ephemeral. 
For students of constitutional law and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, these observations are 
likely to trigger a different ritual incantation: "Different communications media 
are treated differently for First Amendment purposes."' How can one reconcile 
the fact of technological and media convergence with the legal presumption of 
distinct treatments? 
We argue in this Essay that this dilemma should not be resolved by 
permitting the First Amendment to be used as a sword to prevent 
communications convergence or as a shield to permit government agencies to 
force these technologies into distinct, procrustean categories. Rather, the latest 
advances in telecommunications provide federal courts the opportunity to 
discard the inherently silly notion that freedom of speech depends on the 
configuration of the speaker's voicebox or mouthpiece. 
t Dean and Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. I wish to thank Enc Bern !hal and Gary 
Epstein for cajoling me into putting these thoughts together and to the participants in the Wilham and Mary 
Law School faculty workshop for helping me to refine them, and to Julie Patterson for helpful research 
assistance. 
tt Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texa.s. 
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(newspaper) and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (broadcast teleVIsion)); su also 
infra note 4. 
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Further, reflection will show that this step would not be a radical 
jurisprudential leap. In truth, among all mass communication technologies, only 
broadcast radio and television have been afforded distinctive treatment. History 
reveals that the unusual jurisprudence of broadcasting rests on the slimmest 
foundations. The Supreme Court crafted these rules not so much because the 
Justices believed broadcasting was distinct, but more because the Court's major 
free speech cases concerning broadcasting arose when the Justices were deeply 
conflicted over the relationships between rights of speech and of property2 or 
were deeply divided among themselves over the issue of "obscene" or 
"indecent" speech. 3 
Moreover, to achieve the rational goals of those who prefer to tame the 
broadcast industry, it is not necessary to retain a separate First Amendment 
jurisprudence for broadcasters. If we look behind the facade of broadcast free 
speech law, we can discern established, durable, fundamental principles that 
govern regulation of mass communications without regard to the technology 
employed, that protect freedom of speech while leaving ample room for sober 
regulation, and that apply equally well to all mass communication media. We 
believe that the growing telecommunications convergence should lead the 
Court to embrace these principles explicitly while discarding the false notion 
that "broadcasting" (whatever that is) requires or deserves a separate First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
This Essay proceeds in four steps. We first explain, briefly, the well-
known dualism in mass media law today: one rule for broadcasters, another for 
printers. We then describe the kinds of objections made to broadcast 
programming today, confident that similar criticisms will be voiced about the 
program fare offered by emerging video, audio, and data technologies. In step 
three, we explain how the "print" model is in fact a coherent and complete 
system of regulatory ideals, built on four well-established and sensible 
principles, reflecting current regulation of all nonbroadcast mass media. 
Finally, we conclude that this more general model will adequately serve the 
goals of the sober broadcast regulator while providing a sound basis for 
judging regulation of emerging technologies as well. The progressive 
congruence of telecommunications technologies, then, ought to be the catalyst 
for two jurisprudential developments: (1) discarding the broadcast model and 
(2) realizing that traditional First Amendment principles-not yet another set 
of unique rules-are quite well suited to guide and constrain public regulation 
of these new technologies. 
2. THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMINO 
182-89 (1994) [hereinafter REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMING). 
3. /d. at 196-202. 
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I. Two MODELS 
No matter how often one repeats the statement, it cannot be true that 
"[d]ifferent communications media are treated differently for First Amendment 
purposes.'>4 Should everything we knew about regulation of books have been 
discarded once talking motion pictures were invented? Did discovery of the 
personal computer (or was it the monitor screen?) render obsolete everything 
the courts said about the First Amendment and broadcasting, or cable, or 
telephones? Once a free speech jurisprudence is written for computers, must 
we refuse to employ those rules for a later technology, such as satellites, lest 
we treat different communications media identically for First Amendment 
purposes? 
Fortunately, it never has been true that each communications medium gets 
its own free speech rules. Except broadcasting. It is only because of the special 
status of broadcasting that we can accurately report that constitutional law 
today reflects two distinct, well-developed models for assessing government 
regulation of mass communications. The first, and dominant, model is typically 
referred to as the "print" model but in fact applies to most mass 
communications media in the United States. 
This so-called print model is most neatly encapsulated in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo,5 with its emphasis on the value of editorial 
autonomy and the dangers of official censorship. If The Miami Herald wished 
to throw the full weight of its dominant position in the Miami market to 
preclude the election of a union leader for state representative,6 then the First 
Amendment authorized its action. The media owner decides what is said and 
how it will be said. As A.J. Liebling quipped: "Freedom of the press is 
guaranteed only to those who own one.''7 Or, as the Court more delicately put 
it: "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection 
and choice of material.''8 
A second, competing model is aptly termed the "broadcast" model. It 
stems from six decades of regulation and is most thoroughly elucidated in Red 
Lion Broadcasting,9 with its celebration of the values of access and diversity 
and concomitant fear of private censorship. This model allows governments to 
intervene to promote First Amendment values by mandating a more diverse 
programming fare than broadcasters might otherwise choose. Ideas and 
speakers are thereby afforded access to listeners and viewers. 
4. 476 U.S. at 496. The statement has its origins in Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S n. CJ7 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (sound trucks); its strongest statement is in Chief Jusuce Burger's d1s.sent m 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Burger, CJ., d1s.senung) (b11lboords). 
5. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right-of-reply statute). 
6. L.A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 SUP. cr. REv. 345, 351~2. 
7. A.J. LIEBUNG, THE PREss 32 (Pantheon Books 1981) (1975). 
8. CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973). 
9. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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Red Lion permits-indeed, virtually exhorts-government to override 
broadcasters' programming preferences to effectuate the right of listeners and 
viewers "to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and 
other ideas and experiences."10 Possessed of this authority, federal regulators 
have wondered (as they need not with print) how to "measure the conflicting 
claims of grand opera and religious services, of market reports and direct 
advertising, of jazz orchestras and lectures on the diseases of hogs." 11 And 
a more recent regulator, reflecting on a massive tornado that hit Wichita Falls, 
Texas, rejoiced that "'[y]oung people listening to a rock station"' received 
warnings that they might not have had "'if we didn't require the licensee to 
provide a minimum of news."'12 But, lest broadcasting become too diverse, 
the model is supplemented by a related power of government to enforce a level 
of conformity when issues of community morality are implicated. 13 The 
extent of this authorization to censor "indecent" broadcasting is largely 
undefined, although as stated it clearly exceeds the censorship power permitted 
by the print model. 
While the print model has been criticized, 14 none of the critics has 
suggested that its deficiencies result in any way from a failure to consider fully 
the text, history, traditions, and constitutional structure of the First 
Amendment. The deficiencies in the model are deemed to arise, not from 
misguided constitutional interpretation, but from the increasing power of the 
press and the diminishing quality of news and information produced by those 
exercising their First Amendment rights. By contrast, critics of the broadcast 
model have noted that it does not conform to the text, history, traditions, or 
constitutional structure of the First Amendment and that the results of allowing 
government to regulate so intrusively create just the abuses that the print model 
postulates would occur in a system of government supervision: favoritism, 
censorship, and political influence. 15 
Both the print and the broadcast models have attractive features. The 
appeal of the print model stems from its congruence with the canons of 
IO. /d. at 390. 
I I. I FED. RADIO COMM'N, ANN. REP. 6 (1927). 
I2. Lionel Van Deerling, The Regulators and Broadcast News, in BROADCAST JOURNALISM 204, 206 
(Marvin Barrett ed., I982) (quoting Commissioner Abbott Washburn). 
13. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing FCC to channel "indecent" broadcasts 
to hours in which risk of children listening would be minimized). We do not discuss this censorship power 
at length in this Essay. One reason is that reflection will show, as subsequent cases are revealing, that 
Pacifica is not really a case about broadcasting. Rather, it is about the problem of semiobscenc speech in 
more-than-ordinarily intrusive media from which children are not easily excluded. REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 199-202, 221. 
14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TiiE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH {1993); Jerome 
A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Owen M. 
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 7I IOWA L. REV. I405 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 
HARv. L. REv. 78I (1987); Judith Lichtenberg, Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL. 
& PuB. AFF. 329 (1987). 
I5. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND TiiE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 294-96. 
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constitutional interpretation: text, history, structure, traditions. The broadcast 
model is attractive because it recognizes the relationship between speech and 
the distribution of economic resources, because it encourages a worthy 
journalistic ethic, and because it posits, as the print model does not, that the 
freedom of the press (like any other provision of the Constitution16) may 
change with the times. 17 
The print model strictly confines governmental ability to regulate 
programming. If applied to new technologies, the practical effect would be an 
unfettered discretion to program virtually anything except obscenity. By 
contrast, the broadcast model grants governments ample leeway to affect 
programming decisions, whether to expand access and diversity or to exact 
conformity. Indeed, no other area of First Amendment jurisprudence is so 
deferential to government intervention, and we are aware of no one who has 
suggested that the government needs more power to regulate the media than 
this model authorizes. 
Those wishing to eschew an either/or choice between a jurisprudence that 
permits too much or one that allows too little program autonomy (or 
government power) can easily envision a third model splitting some of the 
differences. Encased in appropriate formulaic language, 18 a third model could 
give the government some flexibility, when necessary, to regulate 
programming, but nothing more. This intermediate model could incorporate the 
insights of the broadcast model while cutting back on its intrusiveness into 
areas of programming. Essentially such a third model would attempt to fashion 
rules appropriate for the technologies regulated that are no more intrusive than 
necessary to accomplish the government's objectives. Because each technology 
is perceived as creating its own problems, government is allowed some, but 
not necessarily complete, leeway to remedy those problems. A bare majority 
of the Supreme Court has tentatively and uneasily accepted this middle 
approach in a case concerning freedom of speech and cable television, Turner 
Broadcasting .19 
As communications technologies converge, it will be impossible for the 
Supreme Court to continue to rely on its bipolar (or tripolar) print-broadcasting 
models. Which of these models "fits" pictures transmitted through cable TV 
lines, telephone lines, satellites, microwave? (In fact, today some television 
16. New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713,761 (1971) (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ('1"hc 
First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution."). 
17. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A Flu;£ PREss (1991). 
18. ROBERT E NAGEL, CoNsnnmONAL CULTURES 122-55 (1989). 
19. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. CL 2445, 2449-51 (1994) (n:qu•ring government 
to prove necessity of requirement that all cable systems carry all locally received over-the-air broadcast 
signals if broadcasters so demand). We believe "tentatively and uneasily" is an apt description of a ~ 
decision where one of the five Justices (Blackmun) retires immediately and then: is every reason to believe 
the Justices in the majority have no idea how little evidence supports the "nccc:ssity" of the must-carry 
rules. 
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viewers watch programs that, in traveling from producer to the home, have 
traveled part of that distance on each of these media.) And which of these 
models fits a scholarly journal that is electronically created and transmitted and 
only placed on the printed page if some recipient so chooses? Would 
newspapers and magazines suddenly come within a broader scope of content 
regulation if they were electronically transmitted to their subscribers? 
The two (or three) models would yield different outcomes when applied 
to program content regulation, but none hinders government in regulating the 
structure or commercial practices of the industry to foster and protect 
competition. Associated Press v. United States'-0 held that the antitrust laws 
fully apply to the print media, and more generally appears to permit 
government to define and limit ownership rights and commercial contractual 
relationships in ways perceived to better the functioning of new 
technologies.21 Thus the battle over the appropriate First Amendment model 
for new technologies is about government's latitude to control what is created 
and consumed, not about its authority to control the structure or commercial 
practices of the industry. 
II. TRADmONAL RATIONALES FOR REGULATION 
How will the emerging communications industry be structured and what 
will it deliver? Frankly, we do not know. 1\venty-five years ago many of the 
same predictions we hear today for the infobahn-the interconnected grid of 
emerging telecommunication technologies-were made for cable television. 
Americans were told to ready themselves for a communications revolution.22 
Network television had been homogenizing the country; cable would 
decentralize it. Network economics required mass audiences; cable could 
"affirmatively pinpoint differentiated audiences and serve them 
economically."23 There would now be a means to reach "unrecognizable 
broadcast interests, financing opera, a different kind of news, or other 
specialized programming."24 This glorious future has yet to materialize, as 
Bruce Springsteen's song, "57 Channels and Nothing On," laments. The cable 
20. 326 U.S. I (1945). 
21. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (unanimously sustaining 
rules prohibiting future newspaper-broadcast co-ownership in same community). 
22. There were numerous reports, but the most quoted was that of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 
which, "feeling that a politically-appointed Commission might not reach the wisest results, assembled n 
distinguished group of more or less elder statesmen, asking them to deliberate for a year and then to 
formulate a set of resolutions that could aid the [Federal Communications] Commission, Congress or any 
other relevant decisionmaking body." Monroe E. Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation, 61 VA. L. REV. 541, 
553 (1975). The end product was SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON TIJE CADLE: THE 
TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971). Price's wonderful article provides a superbly ironical summary of 
cable's era of hope: "All those channels, all those hopes, the chance for a wholly new communications 
system-it was a little intoxicating." Price, supra, at 541 (footnote omitted). 
23. Price, supra note 22, at 547. 
24. ld. at 548. 
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experience cautions us to avoid technological predictions. We leave to others 
descriptions of what new communications technology will look like or what 
programs and information it will deliver.25 
We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court that understanding the 
regulation of an older communications media can offer no guidance to 
understanding a newer one. We believe that past complaints will be prologue 
for future complaints about what creators place on, and users receive from, the 
infobahn.26 Some will complain that an insufficient amount of the appropriate 
type or quality of information is available, probably supplemented by a further 
concern that when the right information is available not enough users are 
tuning in. Others, by contrast, will complain that users may be accessing 
information they ought not have. These views generated a virtual panoply of 
FCC regulations of broadcast content in the past six decades, regulations that 
we have chronicled elsewhere.27 
We have noticed that all regulations of broadcast programming share 
certain features and assumptions. When regulators conclude that viewers and 
listeners are not tuning in to what the consumers need, regulators tend to 
counter by attempting to make the merit programming28 available everywhere. 
In this fashion, all viewers and listeners, even those who will not change 
channels, should, at least occasionally, encounter and benefit from good 
programming. Conversely, bad programming commonly seems too popular. 
Therefore it must be banned, reduced in quantity, or shunted to periods of 
infrequent broadcast usage lest viewers and listeners change channels and find 
the disfavored programming somewhere else. 
The former type of regulation-diversity or merit regulation-posits 
helpless or obstinate viewers. The other type-straightforward censor-
ship-posits enterprising viewers. These apparently contrasting views of 
broadcast consumers as both paralyzed and enterprising are just two convenient 
interpretations of a simple fact: It is impossible to regulate viewers and 
listeners. Both types of regulations also rest on a common perspective: Viewers 
and listeners are incapable of wise choice. Indeed, when given the option of 
seeing exactly what a regulator or a critic prefers, viewers often watch 
something else. 
We are quite certain that the new electronic technologies will not alter 
these facts of life. In the new era, viewers will watch or read what critics and 
regulators like with insufficient frequency and will enjoy too often what 
25. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and \Vhar /r \Viii Do. 104 YALE U. 1805 (1995). 
26. What follows are criticisms drawn from a much lengthier work. We urge skcpucs to read that work 
before rejecting these conclusions. See REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMING. supra note 2. at 59-141. 
297-315. 
27. /d. at 59-141. 
28. Merit programming is programming deemed so valuable that broodc:astcrs wen: rcqu1rcd to a1r 1t. 
even if few (if any) viewers or listeners wished to tunc it in. Su 1d. at 145-46. 
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commissioners and columnists abhor. It seems all but inevitable that such 
behavior by viewers, listeners, and readers will generate calls for government 
action. At this point the search for appropriate guiding principles begins. 
ill. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF REGULATION 
In our recently published book, Regulating Broadcast Programming,29 we 
articulated guiding principles for regulating the mass media that are well 
established, yet often not recognized for what they are-the cornerstones of a 
rather consistent pattern of American regulation of the nonbroadcast mass 
media. 30 These bedrock legal principles, as applied to such diverse 
communications media as books, films, magazines, theater, newspapers, 
recordings, and speech in public forums, function so well that they are often 
taken for granted. 
As computers, satellites, and telephone lines become readily available 
alternatives to VHF, UHF, cable, and microwave transmission of radio and 
television, it should become simpler even for the Supreme Court Justices to 
realize that only a unitary First Amendment for all media will do. In the 
remainder of this Essay, we explain these ground rules of constitutional law 
and regulatory policy, show how and why they shape government's basic 
stance toward all nonbroadcast media, and demonstrate how these principles 
encompass emerging technologies. 
A. Basic Principles 
Four principles collectively establish the proper responsibilities of 
government in regulating the structure and performance of the mass media and 
in supervising access to, and diversity within, those media. They are the 
principles that, shaped by carefully considered First Amendment values, govern 
the legal regulation of virtually all other mass media in the United States. 
These principles provide government with ample authority to regulate the 
media in ways that can improve their performance, while assuring that 
government is responsive to, rather than responsible for, American culture, 
information, and politics. These ground rules of constitutional law and 
regulatory policy regarding the nonbroadcast media also help to ensure that 
laws governing the media are targeted at issues government can manage, while 
avoiding regulations that are simply naive or directed at foisting particular 
preferences on a pluralist society.31 
29. ld. 
30. !d. at 316-22. 
31. The principles set out below are not, under current law, fully applicable where government itself 
is the speaker or where the speech is properly classified as "commercial speech." Consequently, the analysis 
does not necessarily apply to cases in which the government is the programmer or the information 
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1. First Principle 
Editorial control over what is said and how it is said should be lodged in 
private, not governmental, institutions. Two basic rationales underlie this 
principle. They are well stated in Miami Herald Pub/is/zing Co. v. Tomi/lo,32 
and so we only summarize them here. 
In the first place, both history and theory clearly teach that the imposition 
by law of "good journalism" or "fair representation" requirements on speakers 
operates to chill speech, not to liberate, broaden, or protect it.33 Telling 
speakers "if you discuss x, you must do (or discuss) y" has the principal effect 
of inhibiting discussion of x. Further, such government intervention cannot add 
more speech; at its very best, that intervention can only substitute speech on 
one topic for speech on another. 
In the second place, editorial control, because it is invariably content-
based, is an inherently impermissible government function.J.I When 
government edits, it does so for debatable purposes and with questionable 
means; that editing necessarily stifles unpopular viewpoints.n To mention just 
two well-known examples: Red Lion was part of a John Kennedy-Lyndon 
Johnson Democratic National Committee effort to silence right-wing radio 
stations that might oppose the Democrats in 1964,36 and the stripping of the 
Reverend Carl Mcintire's WXUR of its license because of fairness doctrine 
violations reduced both the amount of controversial programming and the 
range of available viewpoints in the Philadelphia area.37 
The competing principle is drawn from broadcasting: It is regulation in the 
public interest. As stated by Red Lion, government supervision of broadcasters' 
programming is essential because "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. "38 If broadcasters were 
left to their own discretion (or insufficiently controlled), they would pander to 
the lowest common denominator, decreasing the quality of important 
information while simultaneously increasing commercialization.39 Such 
programming is not in the public interest and neglects the need to create an 
constitutes solely commercial speech. We shall turn. in part. to government speech m our d1scuss1on of the 
fourth principle, see infra text accompanying notes 6~. 
32. 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see also REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 176-TI 
33. It is for these reasons that no one would dream of imposing a "balanced coverage" rule on Barbrn 
Streisand, Steven Spielberg, Tom Clancy, or William F. Buckley. Jr. 
34. For an extensive demonstration of this point as applied to the frurnes.s dOCinne, equal-umc 
provisions, and indecency regulation, see POWE, supra note 15, at 108-90. 
35. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF TilE FIRST AME.-:oME.'ol 16-25 
(1966). 
36. POWE, supra note 15, at 112-16. 
37. REGULATING BROADCASf PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 266-08. 
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citation ommed). 
39. Tracy Westin, among others, argues that this has occurred. Public lnrt!nm m Broadcasrmg: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Financl! of rltt! Housl! Comm. on Enugy and 
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 117-18 (1991). 
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intelligent, civicly active community where all citizens have access to the full 
range of information that they need for self-government. 
Under the public interest model, government and citizens attentive to civic 
issues have a role in promoting and improving the community's common 
values. It is not an adequate response to contend that those who choose to 
watch, hear, or read information or entertainment that does not further civic 
values must prefer or enjoy what they choose. 
Preferences that have adapted to an objectionable system cannot 
justify that system. If better options are put more regularly in view, 
it might well be expected that at least some people would be educated 
as a result. They might be more favorably disposed toward 
programming dealing with public issues in a serious way.40 
Accordingly, for adherents to the public interest model, government may, 
indeed should, regulate access to the media (whether new or old) so as to 
improve and inform those among its citizens who are not already attuned to 
the public interest. From this perspective the Supreme Court's observation that 
"no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient"41 
is simply wrong.42 
Such a public interest rationale for broadcast regulation resulted in FCC 
rules (or guidelines) designed to create local programming (at the expense of 
national programming),43 to produce minimum amounts of news and public 
affairs,44 to require balanced presentation of important and controversial 
issues,45 to guarantee access to candidates for federal elective office,46 to 
suppress music that glorified drug use,47 to suppress dirty words and 
discussions of sex,48 to limit commercials,49 and to increase educational 
programming that children should watch.5° Currently there are advocates who 
claim that the public interest would also require limiting violence51 and 
reducing stereotypes52 and maybe increasing the numbers of Hispanics and 
40. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsmuriON 221 (1993). Those who have raised children with 
specific goals in mind, and lots of one-on-one time over the years to educate and instruct, can only wish 
that the transmission of preferences was so easy. 
41. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
42. One may search SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, as well as his contribution to this Symposium, Cass R. 
Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE LJ. 1757 (1995), without finding a single 
mention of Rowan. 
43. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 44. 
44. /d. at 77-79. 
45. /d. at 61-65. 
46. /d. at 66-69. 
47. /d. at 115-18. 
48. /d. at 104-14. 
49. /d. at 135-36. 
50. /d. at 81-84. The FCC has defined children's programming as that which is educational first and 
entertainment second, thereby seemingly excluding programming watched by the whole family. /d. at 84. 
51. /d. at 120-34. 
52. /d. at 304-05. 
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overweight people on the air.53 Unless the public interest is a fixed concept, 
presumably other programs that the public needs could be added to this list. 
The less attractive results of the public interest model are those regulations 
that smack of overt censorship. A programmer is forbidden to create, stations 
are forbidden to air, and adults are forbidden to view and hear programming 
that would otherwise be available in the market because either Congress or a 
few commissioners believe that adults are incapable of evaluating what they 
wish to view. It does not matter whether the banning institution represents a 
permanent majority of Americans, a transient majority, or a minority that has 
captured the institution (as appears to have been the case with the 1987 FCC 
indecency decisions).54 It does not matter whether the purpose of the 
regulation is to entrench or change the status quo. In each case, government 
fiat substitutes for the choices that adult Americans would otherwise make.55 
While censorship is wrong, mandating a more diverse fare often seems 
right. Thus a newcomer to this area might be tempted to conclude, for 
example, ~at a rule requiring television stations to broadcast more children's 
programming would be a good thing. Ultimately this rests on the view that any 
"children's program," no matter how bad, is more likely than not to be better 
than the alternatives (no matter what the audience may think). Unfortunately, 
however, true quality comes from a program's substance, not its topic,S6 and 
FCC efforts to create quality programs that broadcasters do not wish to air, 
while sporadic, have been unsuccessful.57 
There are basic reasons why regulatory efforts to mandate quality are 
ineffective. First, even with television there is too much time to fill and too 
few truly imaginative people to fill it.58 Second, audiences appear to know 
what they like and will resist attempts to re-program their tastes. As Jeff 
Greenfield notes, "when you no longer need the skills of a safecracker to find 
PBS in most markets, you have to realize that the reason people aren't 
watching is that they don't want to."59 
53. ld. 
54. See John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Cunous HISIOT)' of the Nn¥ FCC 
Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CAlli. U. L. REv. 329, 344-47 (1989). 
55. Contrast Justice Robert Jackson: "If there is any fixed sw in our constituuonal constcllauon. 11 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poliucs. nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 ( 1943) (Jackson, 
J.). 
56. Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencu~s. 15 HARV. L REv. 1055, 1071 (1962) 
(doubting whether "the Commission is really wise enough to determine that live telecasts ... e.g., of local 
cooking lessons, are always 'better' than a tape of Shakespeare's Histories"). 
57. See REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 70-74, 99-100. 
58. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Role of Government, in FREEDOM AND REsPONSIBILITY IN BROAOCASllNG 
35, 39 (John Coons ed., 1961). Eric Sevareid put the point succinctly: '"Considenng the number of hours 
you had to fill, it's surprising that there's even enough mediocrity to go around." Quoted m REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 312. 
59. Quoted in REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 314. 
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With newer technologies offering users many more options to watch, hear, 
or read many more programs and sources of information, these problems will 
be exacerbated geometrically. Much of the information on the infobahn will 
be dreck. But users, rather than regulators, will hold the trump cards, because 
only users can decide how they will spend their time perusing the increased 
options. Information will have to appeal to users, not government bureaucrats 
or academic critics, if it is to have a substantial audience. In other words, 
future users of the infobahn will behave very much like current purchasers of 
magazines, books, or recordings-and they should be permitted to do so. 
2. Second Principle 
As a matter of policy, government should foster access by speakers to 
media. Clearly, government has an important role to play in ensuring that the 
media are not monopolized and in expanding the opportunities of citizens to 
speak and to be heard. People who own instrumentalities of communication 
have incentives to reduce their use in order to charge monopoly prices and 
equally strong incentives to prevent or retard the development of competing 
instrumentalities. We cannot assume that those efforts will always fail of their 
own accord. Further, government funding of basic research is often an efficient 
way of uncovering new communications technologies or new uses for 
established vehicles, both of which can widen access by increasing the number 
of available communication channels. 
That government should foster speakers' access to the mass media is not 
a controversial proposition. What has proved quite contestable, however, 
although usually only with respect to broadcast regulation, is the meaning of 
access. In broadcasting, access is often defined as replacing the broadcaster's 
choice of programming with programming chosen by someone not associated 
with the station.60 By contrast, when we examine government's relations to 
other mass media, it seems reasonably clear that, for purposes of the access 
principle, access means the abiJity to reach any willing recipient by any 
speaker willing to pay the economic costs61 of doing so (and does not mean 
that government must or should require others to subsidize the would-be 
communicator). For example, in book publishing we do not assume that access 
to book publishers is inadequate if an author is not published because 
publishers believe her book will not sell enough copies to pay for printing 
costs. 
60. ld. at 243, 244-45. 
61. Economic costs are the costs (including opportunity costs) of resources employed in 
communicating, not necessarily the prices charged by (perhaps monopolistic) owners of those resources. 
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3. Third Principle 
Government policies should foster diversity in the media marketplace. If 
government adheres to the first and second principles, this third principle will 
follow automatically because it is the opposite side of the coin. Properly 
understood, the quest for diversity does not require government to provide 
people speech that they do not value as much as its costs of production and 
distribution. And, quite obviously, the quest for diversity does not justify 
censoring some programming upon a theory that the censorship will necessarily 
generate some different programming. 
Instead, diversity is achieved when people are allowed to bid for any 
information or entertainment they desire-no censorship-and to receive what 
they seek, so long as they are willing to pay the economic costs of receiving 
it. That is, the diversity principle dictates that there be no artificial 
government-imposed barriers to transmission or reception of speech. 
This principle, too, is evident in our settled expectations regarding legal 
control of the nonbroadcast mass media. For example, the magazine market is 
regarded as diverse because people are free to subscribe to magazines on any 
or all topics. We do not regard diversity in the magazine market as incomplete 
if some topics or formats that might lend themselves to magazine treatment are 
not published because to do so would cost more than subscribers (or 
advertisers) are willing to pay.62 
4. Fourth Principle 
Government is not permitted to sacrifice any of the three foregoing 
principles to further goals associated with either or both of the others. Where 
such sacrifice is not needed, however, government may extend the goals 
associated with any of those principles. Put another way, the Constitution does 
not mandate subsidies for those seeking access to, or diversity from, the mass 
communications media;63 neither does the Constitution prohibit such 
subsidies. 
62. One might make precisely the same points about the theatncal film market as well Movacs prov1de 
diversity in the sense that people are free to make. to exhibit. and to anend any mov1e whose costs of 
production can be covered by expected box office (and tape rental. cable liccnsmg. and other) receipts. We 
do not regard the movie market as nondiverse, and in need of further government mtervenuon. even though 
we can easily imagine films that we might like to see but whose costs of producuon cannot be recaptured 
by the expected income from selling tickets. and other sources. 
63. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm .• 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holdmg First Amendment docs not 
mandate citizen access to airwaves); Cox v. New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569. 577 (1941 l (sustrumng exactiOn 
of fee "incident to the administration of the (licensing) Act and to the maintenance of pubhe order m the 
matter licensed"). We recognize that there is a subsidy inherent m the mandate that go\·emment allow 
speakers to use the public streets and parks to communicate. We are aware of nothmg comparable m the 
area of mass communications. 
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One of the newest technologies traces its rapid growth to the application 
of this principle. The federal government has borne most of the costs of 
establishing the infrastructure that is the Internet, thereby increasing the 
diversity of the fare available and the accessibility of this medium without 
favoring any speaker or viewpoint.64 Antecedent similar examples abound. 
During the era before cable, we were all the richer for the decision to create 
and subsidize PBS. Perhaps the benefits of PBS did not exceed its economic 
costs, but government financing of PBS did no damage to the system of 
freedom of expression. We cannot know how many magazines have been 
created and continue to exist because of second-class mailing privileges, but, 
again, we are better for their existence, because more information is better than 
less. 
Indeed, to the extent the marketplace is perceived as impoverished, 
subsidies may be an effective way of correcting its inadequacies, so long as 
these are true subsidies rather than extractions from media competitors. 65 
Furthermore, as Mark Yudof's seminal, award-winning work, When 
Government Speaks,66 explains, the policy issues, while rich and complex, are 
largely freed from the restraints that the First Amendment otherwise imposes 
on government actions. 
B. Sources of the Basic Principles 
For those familiar with basic First Amendment law and general American 
regulatory policy toward the mass media, reflection will reveal that virtually 
all First Amendment rules and regulatory policies toward the mass 
media--other than broadcasting-rest on the four principles set out above. 
Consider the print media. With little or no controversy, we recognize (or 
tolerate) the following four propositions. First, a regulation that provides, "If 
you write about x, you must behave according to specified journalistic norms," 
puts a chill on writing about x. Second, print media are "accessible" platforms 
to speakers, even if no one gets published at no cost. Third, the print media 
provide "diversity," even if we are not assured that every worthwhile view will 
be offered for sale. Fourth, the First Amendment divested government of 
power over, or responsibility for, the behavio: of editors. Indeed, we might 
well say that these are the premises underlying Tornillo. 
We believe American citizens and policymakers embrace those 
propositions not because they slavishly agree to anything the Supreme Court 
says, but because of our society's shared belief in the following three empirical 
64. See Ralph Vartabedian, Colleges Fear Research Cuts by Pentagon, L.A. nMES, July 22, 1994, at 
AI, A20; Aaron Zitner, A Quiet Leap Forward in Cyberspace, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. II, 1994, at ASS. 
65. To be a subsidy the costs must be spread generally. The earlier principles preclude Inking from 
A to give to B or silencing A to let B speak. 
66. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983). 
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assumptions. First, governmental control over editorial policies typically will 
be exercised in a discriminatory fashion, privileging that which is in vogue, 
mainstream, and safe while handicapping that which is not. Second, 
recipients-readers, listeners, viewers-are capable of judging the quality of 
a speaker's presentation and abandoning those speakers who do not measure 
up to the recipients' standards. Third, speakers compete within and across 
media for potential recipients, so that the public is constantly presented with 
a variety of viewpoints from which to choose. Further, it is only because we 
believe that markets for ideas and values operate in this fashion that we have 
chosen to place constitutional constraints on government's authority to regulate 
speech. 
We do not blush to admit that we believe these empirical assumptions are 
true.67 Another reason we treat these beliefs about politics, markets, speakers, 
and listeners as a sound basis for erecting principles to govern legal regulation 
of the media is "the belief that no other approach would comport with the 
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system 
rests."68 If, for example, we build legal rules on the assumption that recipients 
can discriminate among speakers and speeches, this should tend to become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Recipients will need to develop the ability to 
discriminate. 
Of course, we cannot prove that those empirical assumptions are generally 
truthful reflections of reality, and we know that they are not always so. But, 
for purposes of our argument, it is quite important to note a fact that is not 
contestable. That fact is that these assumptions about politics, markets, 
speakers, and listeners underlie virtually every facet of First Amendment law 
and nonconstitutional regulatory policy toward the (nonbroadcast) mass media. 
Constitutional and statutory rules aimed at not only the print media, but all 
mass media other than broadcasting, are premised on the notion that, although 
government has important duties or opportunities to expand access and 
diversity through content-neutral actions, the goals of an open, stable 
democracy are best advanced by relying on recipients to choose from among 
competing speakers unconstrained by government. "To many this is, and 
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.'>69 
IV. APPUCATION TO CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
As we noted at the outset, emerging technologies erase any tenable line 
delineating that which is broadcasting and exempt from these principles and 
67. Especially if we add "for the most part and in the long run." which arc the conditions that really 
matter. 
68. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS, 24 (1971}. 
69. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L Hand, J.); su 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 175-79. 
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that which is not. The principles just discussed offer broadcasters and those 
employing emerging media technologies the full protection of general media 
law while leaving ample room for progressive and helpful regulation. 
What specific forms of regulation should be considered for the era of 
technological convergence? Three central points emerge: Content control 
should be forbidden; entry barriers should be reduced and eliminated whenever 
possible; and common carrier status must be carefully evaluated. 
A. No Content Controls 
This regulatory strategy flows automatically from our first principle stated 
earlier. It applies equally to emerging technologies, which must, after all, 
compete for users' attention, in the same manner that magazines, newspapers, 
and books seek readers. 
B. Reduce Entry Barriers 
To help assure that new communications technologies are user friendly 
rather than centrally controlled-whether by government or by industry-the 
most important policy government could adopt is a commitment to foster as 
much competition as possible among would-be speakers for audience attention. 
This obligation, rooted in free speech concerns, mandates reducing barriers to 
entry that confront pqtential speakers. This includes those who wish to employ 
established technologies, such as television stations broadcasting in the VHF 
spectrum. For example, long ago the FCC made many decisions that 
substantially constrict the number of VHF stations that can now be licensed. 70 
Those decisions can be reversed.71 The obligation should extend also to 
potential speakers desiring to employ new technologies-such as 
communications networks that link up portable computers. Federal regulation 
has effectively delayed the entry of, first, portable cellular telephones and, 
later, portable interactive minicomputers, by failing to establish fluid 
mechanisms for allocating and reallocating spectrum in response to emerging 
technologies and consumer demand. That omission can and should be 
remedied. 
Reducing entry barriers and extending the spectrum available for 
communication of information and entertainment serve the goals of both access 
and diversity by lowering the costs of communicating and expanding the 
70. Several of these choices are detailed in Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of 
Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management 
Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981). 
71. This might, however, be a second-best solution today. It might be preferable to free up VHF 
spectrum for other communications uses and move television to cable and satellite transmission, where it 
would not block so many other valuable uses. 
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opportunities for doing so. In this fashion, readers, listeners, and viewers are 
empowered, without governmental censorship to control what is offered and 
what is consumed. By simply determining what (if any) materials to access, 
users of the infobahn can force programmers to serve their interests and 
desires.72 To the sober media critic who understands the modest possibilities 
of achieving real change through regulation, such a program ought to be vastly 
more appealing than the kinds of clumsy and usually ineffective content 
controls that were at the center of the fairness doctrinen and that underlie 
present regulation of children's television.7~ 
Perhaps the point seems so obvious that to emphasize it is to belabor it. 
We emphasize it because history teaches a consistent lesson regarding the 
introduction of new communications technologies: Government should be wary 
of private barriers to communication and equally wary of public barriers. 
Indeed, if the past is prologue, entrenched private interests will use public 
policy to achieve their goals of limiting competition. 
Surely, the FCC has known that erecting or maintaining entry barriers is 
counterproductive. Even Congress has realized this. A key section of the 
Communications Act of 1934 directs the Commission "to encourage the larger 
and more effective use of radio in the public interest."75 Yet, although the 
FCC has always had available the option to reduce barriers to entry and 
thereby expand the number of broadcast outlets accessible to the public, 
Commission policy from the agency's inception through at least the next fifty 
years was to retard the growth of broadcasting. 
A principal reason Congress created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) 
was to reduce competition among existing stations.76 One of the first 
decisions the FRC made was not to follow the European example of 
broadening the broadcast band.77 Listeners would thus not be troubled by 
having to choose between retaining their old sets limited to stations already 
72. Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood. m a remarkably prescrcnt arucle wntten 
in 1929, stated: 
I can state, on the best authority, that all television sets wrll be equrpped. as all mdro sets are 
now equipped, with control switches. Thus, when any one decrdes that he has been fed to the 
teeth ... he has only to tum the little switch and shut the darned thing off 
Robert E. Sherwood, Beyond the Talkies-Televisron, SCRIBNER'S MAG., July 1929. at I. 8 All too often 
the on-off switch is forgotten in discussions. 
Similarly, government regulation fosters diversity when it helps people mnke and enforce chorccs. 
Thus, no basic principle is violated if government requires that consumers be offered computers or reccrvers 
that are engineered so that channels can be permanently or selectively blocked or so that a very wrde range 
of channels can be received. (Where, however, government mandates that only such rccervers be offered. 
it risks reducing access and diversity by increasing the costs of the receivers beyond the wrlhngness of low-
income viewers to pay for the sets.) 
73. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 237-75. 
74. ld. at 81--84. 
75. 47 u.s.c. § 303(g) (1988). 
76. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 21-22; Thomas W. Hazlett, The 
Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & Ecos. 133. 170 (1990) 
77. Hazlett, supra note 76, at 155. 
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available on them or purchasing newer ones that could receive added stations 
made available by broadening the band. 
Following World War II, the Commission set about to structure the 
nascent television industry. After a lengthy hiatus, the FCC adopted a 
comprehensive station allocation plan that put relatively little weight on 
affording most Americans a large number of television signals.78 Instead, the 
plan gave great weight to factors such as placing at least one transmitter in as 
many communities (and, therefore, congressional districts) as possible. 
Consequently, the plan did not even attempt to maximize the number of 
television stations available to American households and for almost forty years 
guaranteed that there would be but three national networks.79 The allocation 
plan sacrificed viewer interests in access and diversity to narrow political 
concerns and entrenched industry goals. 
More recently, as soon as cable television became more than a device to 
expand the reach of existing broadcasters, the FCC took actions to stop it dead 
in its tracks. 80 When the Commission finally decided to let cable grow 
somewhat, it shackled the new medium with programming requirements that 
it never dreamed of imposing on broadcasters. 81 To execute both maneuvers 
the FCC adopted, with the ready assent of reviewing federal courts, a very 
broad reading of its jurisdictional reach.82 In a like vein, before telephone 
companies even dreamed of expanding into offering television services, the 
Commission prohibited them from doing so. 83 
Finally, at present, cable operators assert that telephone companies are 
employing state regulations to prevent cable systems from offering audio 
services that compete with telephony. 84 Meanwhile, telephone companies 
assert that they are handicapped by federal law from offering wired television 
services that would compete with cable. 85 
Proliferating electronic communications technologies make even more 
compelling a regulatory approach that, resting on the four basic principles, 
relies on competition rather than direct governmental oversight to discipline 
firms and to force them to respond to consumer desires. Expanding 
technologies bring lower access costs and wider opportunities for diversity, 
thus diminishing the appeal of most proposals to expand government oversight. 
78. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 87-88. 
79. /d. at 88, 283-84. 
80. See POWE, supra note 15, at 220-23; Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation 
of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONrEMP. PROBS. 77,85-91 (1981). 
81. See POWE, supra note 15, at 223-26; Besen & Crandall, supra note 80, at 92-98. 
82. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority over 
Commercial Television Networks: 11ze Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 403, 435-40 
(1982). 
83. In the Matter of Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849 
'i'l 3-4 (1988). 
84. Ted Hearn, NCTA Takes Up Bailie with States, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1. 
85. "Equal Protection" Sought, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 12, 1994, at 4. 
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More recent government actions suggest reason to hope. Broadcast satellites 
have been launched with comparatively little governmental control. The federal 
government constructed the infrastructure of the Internet, a communications 
technology that permits rather easy and nondiscriminatory access. 
C. Common Carrier Regulation? 
At some point in the evolution of any new communications technology, 
some important group is sure to argue that the industry should be conducted 
on a common carrier basis. For example, when cable was in its infancy, a 
much-debated question was whether cable systems should be required to act 
as common carriers.86 The tendency of analysis to gravitate toward the 
common carrier approach is not surprising. Common carriage is likely to 
appeal to one who grasps the point of Tornillo that editorial control should be 
left in private hands, but also appreciates the premise of Red Lion that a 
powerful unregulated medium may exclude valuable information and 
entertainment. 
Reflection reveals that nothing in the basic principles of mass media 
regulation specifies who must exercise the editorial function. Our traditions, 
as well as the specific language of the First Amendment, only tell us who must 
not be the editor. Editing is not government's job. Speakers edit free of 
governmental control or interference, but they need not own the facilities over 
which they speak. Printing presses, sound stages, recording studios, cable 
systems, and broadcast stations could all be operated as common carriers.S1 
They would behave like existing communications common carriers, that is, for 
example, like local telephone exchange carriers and mobile radio service 
producers and most long-distance microwave services and satellite carriers. 
We should make clear that the common carriage discussed here must be 
consistent with our four principles outlined above. In particular, the regulation 
must be content-neutral, not targeted at particular viewpoints or ideologies. For 
example, imposing common carrier requirements on all Democrats who own 
electronic communications facilities would violate the free speech guarantees 
of the First Amendment. Similarly, randomly choosing one in ten of all AM 
radio stations for common-carriage status would, at least presumptively, lack 
the rational basis required by the Fifth Amendment. 88 
86. For example, the ACLU unsuccessfully argued, in ACLU v. FCC. 523 F.2d I 3-W (9th Cu. 1975), 
that certain Commission rules were flawed becluse they did not impose suffic1ent common carrier 
obligations on cable systems. 
87. Indeed, there exist markets for renting each of these facilities in the Unued Stales today. 
88. One might understand our first principle to suggest that imposing common earner stalus n=ly 
violates that principle becluse government thereby denies someone the right to be an editor. lbat IS. for 
example, if a telephone company is told to operate as a common carrier it loses 1ts right to be an editor. 
This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First. no principle of mass commumcations law holds that one 
has a right to be an editor simply becluse one owns or controls a communications facility. Our principle 
of content neutrality simply holds, as illustrated in the text. that one cannot be pumshed because of the 
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In some instances, imposing common carrier obligations can be an 
effective way to ensure that all speakers receive nondiscriminatory access to 
platforms. Where this occurs, diversity, as we have defined it, is also 
enhanced. In simple terms, the appeal of common carrier regulation is that it 
seems directly responsive to sober claims for content regulation. If, for 
example, the claim is that we need a fairness doctrine for radio to permit 
access by speakers whose views are antithetical to advertisers and so would 
not be carried by advertiser-funded radio stations, one might offer the common 
carrier alternative. Under such a regime, any speech by a speaker willing to 
pay the costs of speaking should be carried (access) and can be received by 
anyone willing to pay any additional costs of receiving it (diversity). 
Common-carriage regulation, however, should not be viewed as a panacea. 
Just because it can be implemented lawfully does not mean it will work well. 
Indeed, we suspect that, for most media, a thoughtful policy analyst will reject 
the common carrier model. 
First, such regulation is not costless. At a minimum, government resources 
must be devoted to defining and enforcing the rules. To assure that common 
carrier prices reflect only the true costs of access may require extensive (and 
expensive) public-utility-type regulation. 
Further, especially as applied to mass communications media, common 
carrier obligations can prevent the achievement of substantial efficiencies. 
Magazine publishers and broadcasters do not simply publish articles or air 
programs. They package groups of articles or programs into a coherent whole. 
This whole package is often more valuable than the sum of its parts because 
the package itself communicates. It describes the mix and quality of data or 
entertainment that the recipient will receive. 
To illustrate, a newsmagazine run on a common carrier basis might, in a 
given week, contain ten stories on health care policy and none on foreign 
policy, depending on which authors showed up first or bid the highest amounts 
for available space. Moreover, the stories may reflect very different standards 
of care in research and writing. Readers might (indeed, probably do) prefer a 
magazine edited by a single publisher because this tends to ensure a greater 
variety of topics, balanced coverage, and a uniform level of quality. The single 
publisher can also provide an overarching point of view, which recipients may 
prefer to obtain as well. 
content of one's speech. Second, imposition of common carrier status cannot entail denial of the right to 
speak. Telephone common carriers, for example, retain the same right to freedom of speech, on their or 
anyone else's facilities, as all communications corporations. The ability to impose common carrier 
obligations on a telephone company does not carry with it the ability to prevent that company from 
transmitting its own messages over its own facilities (although, in extraordinary circumstances, such a 
requirement might be justified by antitrust principles rooted in a legitimate concern for protecting equal 
access rights). 
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Finally, it is not self-evident that common carriers will provide greater 
access opportunities or diversity of style or viewpoint than will publisher-
editors. Where an editor-whether of a newspaper, a broadcast station. or a 
cable system-has the capacity to add a speaker whom audiences wish to 
receive, it is usually in that editor's best interests to provide that speech so 
long as the audiences are willing to pay the (marginal) costs of transmitting 
it. 89 If a cable system can add a channel at the cost of $5 per month, we 
expect it will do so for anyone willing to pay that amount. 
If the problem is lack of capacity, the preferred government response, as 
outlined above, is clear: help to increase capacity, to reduce entry barriers. If 
the cable system cannot or will not add a channel, the better response is to be 
rid of any rules that constrain cable channel expansion and to provide 
alternative means--e.g., by microwave or satellite-of transmitting multiple 
video signals. If the problem is incompatible ideology, the preferred response 
is the same. By reducing entry barriers and preventing monopolization, 
government facilitates competition among editors of diverse ideologies, and 
thus, fosters access to competing viewpoints. 
Common carriage, then, should not be viewed as the preferred basis for 
organizing or regulating the mass media in the United States. In most cases, 
its costs will exceed its benefits. But, in the unusual case, common carrier 
regulation can be a cost-effective means of attaining access and diversity goals 
without engaging in content regulation. For those reasons, a common carrier 
regime that comports with the four principles described above cannot be said, 
on a priori or philosophical grounds, to impose a threat to civil liberties 
comparable to that created by empowering government to displace the 
decisions of private editors. 
Common carrier regulation appears to have been a wise choice for 
common, interactive, wireline audio communication (telephony). With 
telephones, people largely wish to communicate directly with each other and 
so little is lost by denying the phone company an editorial voice over these 
communications. Further, giving telephone companies an editorial discretion 
would be quite risky. The local telephone loop may well be a natural 
monopoly; so one would not expect a rival phone company to come into 
existence to carry messages that the entrenched phone company refused to 
carry. This suggests, additionally, that a common carrier approach toward the 
Internet is equally sensible, for the same reasons. People who use the Internet 
to establish data bases or accessible bulletin boards, however, should not be 
required to carry all comers, because it is possible to establish many such data 
bases or bulletin boards along the Internet. 
89. STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON. AN EcOSO~IIC ANALYSIS OF MASDAlORY LEAsED 
CHANNEL ACCESS FOR CABLE TELEVISION (1982). 
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In this Essay, we make explicit two points that were implicit in our larger 
work, Regulating Broadcast Programming.90 We wrote the book against a 
jurisprudential backdrop that is centered around the view that broadcasting 
through the electromagnetic spectrum was a means of communication so 
different from any medium yet employed that preexisting rules could not be 
safely applied to broadcasting.91 We intended the book to prove just the 
opposite: that the general principles of law and regulation underlying all 
nonbroadcast mass media would be just as workable, and should be fully 
applied, to the broadcast media. To make that point unmistakably clear, we 
intentionally excluded consideration of newer technologies (even cable) from 
our discussion and analysis. In this sense, the book is backward looking and 
deliberately so. 
Implicit in our argument, however, were two points that ought to be made 
explicit on the occasion of this Symposium, with its emphasis on the future. 
First, the advent of new telecommunications technologies, and their 
convergence with the now traditional electronic media of AM, FM, VHF, and 
UHF broadcasting, make even less tenable the view that these traditional media 
require or justify a distinct regulatory jurisprudence. Second, the general 
principles underlying regulation of the nonbroadcast mass media should apply 
fully to the new as well as the old electronic communications media. 
Most proponents of increased government control of broadcast-program 
content have not responded to the arguments advanced in this Essay because 
they have never considered them. That failure may continue with newer 
technologies. In the past, critics rushing to impose their value system on 
broadcasters, listeners, and viewers, have not paused seriously to consider 
whether the faults they perceive in broadcasting could be remedied by means 
fully consistent with the regulatory policies we employ toward all other mass 
media. With those critics, we agree that it is too expensive to get on television, 
and that television offers fare that is both too bland and too vexatious. And we 
agree that similar problems may arise on the infobahn and other newer means 
of mass communications. But we should all be equally able to agree that those 
problems do not require that government employees metaphorically sit as 
gatekeepers on the infobahn. Rather, those government officials ought to be 
reducing entry barriers and expanding access opportunities for programmers 
and viewers. 
For other critics, our arguments must seem hopelessly naive. These are the 
new brand of media critics, the ones who believe that the arguments we have 
just advanced cannot make sense in a world where the distribution of wealth 
90. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. 
91. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969). 
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and resources is badly skewed.92 How can we talk of programmer choice, 
competition among media, or the sovereignty of the listener-viewer when very 
few people have the wealth to create visually appealing programs, when outlets 
have traditionally been restricted in number and reach, and when so many 
telecommunications consumers are too poorly educated to make wise choices, 
too impoverished to be able to make their choices count, or lack the resources 
to access the expanding new technologies? 
To be quite honest about it, we find it rather easy to continue to talk about 
these things. Even if these problems are not alleviated by emerging 
communications technologies,93 what other choice do we have? A society in 
which one governmental entity dictates standards of taste and value lest 
thousands of unrestricted, competing programmers or Internet gophers "dictate" 
those same things? A medium with only one definition of "children's 
programming" rather than the same medium operating with several such 
definitions? Mass media journalism or computer bulletin boards governed by 
the White House's view of balance and fairness rather than the views of 
several networks or hundreds of bulletin board operators competing for 
viewers' and readers' attention?94 A federal agency that agonizes over 
"measur[ing] the conflicting claims ... of jazz orchestras and lectures on the 
diseases of hogs"?95 
We are not persuaded that the "public interest" rephrased in the rhetoric 
of civic republicanism reduces the force of these questions. We have witnessed 
and documented over six decades of public interest regulation of 
broadcasting96 and do not believe that a newer group of concerned regulators, 
animated by civic republicanism, can outperform their forebears.97 Nor, for 
the reasons discussed above, do we see any need for them to try. 
To be sure, our commitment to the bedrock principles of media regulation 
described in this Essay rests on assumptions that are not always true about the 
capacities of recipients of speech and of the speechmakers themselves. 
Interestingly, however, those principles are directly responsive to such 
inadequacies, wherever they occur. The principles teach that government can 
and should play important roles in regulating access and fostering diversity. 
Those techniques, not the methods of the censor, are the appropriate response 
to the imperfect world of electronic communications, no less than to the 
imperfect worlds of book and law review publishing. 
92. See sources cited supra note 14. 
93. As it appears they should be. See Volokh, supra note 25. 
94. See POWE, supra note 15, at 121-42; see also REGUU.TING BROADCAST PROORAMMil'\G, supra 
note 2, at 294-96. 
95. See I FED. RADIO COMM., supra note II, at 6. 
96. See generally REGUU.TING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING. supra note 2. 
97. Despite the record of regulatory failures, those forebears are not an undistinguished group by any 
standards. They include James Lawrence Ay, Clifford Durr, Paul Poncr, Newton Minow, Kenneth Co~. 
Nicholas Johnson, and Richard Wiley. 

